In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:F/Actual Knowing:Putting Facts and Values in PlaceHolmes Rolston III (bio)Knowing needs to be actualized, an act of ours, yet also a discovery of what is actually, factually there. In place ourselves, we manage some awareness of other places. Agents in our knowing, we co-respond, and this emplaces us. But we humans have powers of dis-placement too, of taking up, whether empathetically or objectively, the situations of others, (...) other humans, sometimes others than humans. How do our facts depend on our acts? Do we humans always put in place, or sometimes find put, placed there before us, what we variously value on Earth?To put this provocatively: We need to "green" our beliefs; but every educated person knows that nothing out there is really "green." "Seeing green" is an interaction experience. Perhaps this perceptual experience is a model for the whole: all of our human concepts and percepts color up the world. This is true alike of facts and of values, discoveries and evaluations. Such knowing might be well enough placed, but it is always and only "placed." Our geographical position controls our epistemic composition. Epistemology is inevitably anthropocentric; we are always located in the center of our knowing.But what if the "green" we see is mostly chlorophyll? Photosynthesis is not something we can see at all. In place on Earth, we humans breathe oxygen and would die in minutes without it; we depend on photosynthesis at the foundation of our food chains. We know our own respiratory [End Page 137] and trophic interactions with the plants, and this not simply at the native range experiences of breathing and eating. We have figured out the oxygen/carbon-dioxide/water cycles taking place at molecular levels.Now it seems, however, that we are discovering ourselves placed where the facts are bigger than our acts, including our respiratory (and perceptual) interactions; these extend systemically and are hardly anthropocentric. Epistemologically, we have more to evaluate. "Greening" our belief, environmentally grounding it, will require knowing and appropriately respecting these vital life processes—of which we are a part, but which also are "in place" and "take place" apart from us.1. Embodied, Knowledgeable PersonsWhatever knowledge we gain has to "come through" at our native range. That seems uncontroversial, but what are the implications? Knowledge is relative to our location, our embodiment, our size, our terrestrial habitat. This situation constricts, it may be claimed, what can "come through." Mark Johnson concludes: "Our consciousness and rationality are tied to our bodily orientations and interactions in and with our environment. Our embodiment is essential to who we are, to what meaning is, and to our ability to draw rational inferences and to be creative." He urges us to "put the body back into the mind," that is, epistemologically, to become aware of how the body is there, willy-nilly (1987, xxxviii, xxxvi). Joining with George Lakoff, he claims: "Reason, even in its most abstract form, makes use of, rather than transcends, our animal nature" (Lakoff and Johnson 1999, 4).Katherine Hayles continues: "To be incorporated within a different body would be to live in a different world." She features "interactivity" and explains:Interactivity foregrounds rather than obscures the importance of embodiment. In the interaction model, the body does more than provide a biological support system for the mind. Interaction is possible only because we are embodied, and the precise conditions of our embodiment have everything to do with the nature of those interactions. The range and nature of sensory stimuli available to us, the contexts that affect how those sensory stimuli achieve meaning, the habituated movements and postures that we learn through culture and that are encoded for gender, ethnicity, and class—all affect how learning takes place and how the world comes into being for us.(1995, 56) [End Page 138]All this seems true, if one means that with reincarnation our native range experiences would be different. Wolves have keen noses and with them they experience, if you like, a different world. But the survival value of wolf noses, a situated knowledge for them, is equally true for humans, wolves, and elk, because all three... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:F/Actual Knowing:Putting Facts and Values in PlaceHolmes Rolston III (bio)Knowing needs to be actualized, an act of ours, yet also a discovery of what is actually, factually there. In place ourselves, we manage some awareness of other places. Agents in our knowing, we co-respond, and this emplaces us. But we humans have powers of dis-placement too, of taking up, whether empathetically or objectively, the situations of others, (...) other humans, sometimes others than humans. How do our facts depend on our acts? Do we humans always put in place, or sometimes find put, placed there before us, what we variously value on Earth?To put this provocatively: We need to "green" our beliefs; but every educated person knows that nothing out there is really "green." "Seeing green" is an interaction experience. Perhaps this perceptual experience is a model for the whole: all of our human concepts and percepts color up the world. This is true alike of facts and of values, discoveries and evaluations. Such knowing might be well enough placed, but it is always and only "placed." Our geographical position controls our epistemic composition. Epistemology is inevitably anthropocentric; we are always located in the center of our knowing.But what if the "green" we see is mostly chlorophyll? Photosynthesis is not something we can see at all. In place on Earth, we humans breathe oxygen and would die in minutes without it; we depend on photosynthesis at the foundation of our food chains. We know our own respiratory [End Page 137] and trophic interactions with the plants, and this not simply at the native range experiences of breathing and eating. We have figured out the oxygen/carbon-dioxide/water cycles taking place at molecular levels.Now it seems, however, that we are discovering ourselves placed where the facts are bigger than our acts, including our respiratory (and perceptual) interactions; these extend systemically and are hardly anthropocentric. Epistemologically, we have more to evaluate. "Greening" our belief, environmentally grounding it, will require knowing and appropriately respecting these vital life processes—of which we are a part, but which also are "in place" and "take place" apart from us.1. Embodied, Knowledgeable PersonsWhatever knowledge we gain has to "come through" at our native range. That seems uncontroversial, but what are the implications? Knowledge is relative to our location, our embodiment, our size, our terrestrial habitat. This situation constricts, it may be claimed, what can "come through." Mark Johnson concludes: "Our consciousness and rationality are tied to our bodily orientations and interactions in and with our environment. Our embodiment is essential to who we are, to what meaning is, and to our ability to draw rational inferences and to be creative." He urges us to "put the body back into the mind," that is, epistemologically, to become aware of how the body is there, willy-nilly (1987, xxxviii, xxxvi). Joining with George Lakoff, he claims: "Reason, even in its most abstract form, makes use of, rather than transcends, our animal nature" (Lakoff and Johnson 1999, 4).Katherine Hayles continues: "To be incorporated within a different body would be to live in a different world." She features "interactivity" and explains:Interactivity foregrounds rather than obscures the importance of embodiment. In the interaction model, the body does more than provide a biological support system for the mind. Interaction is possible only because we are embodied, and the precise conditions of our embodiment have everything to do with the nature of those interactions. The range and nature of sensory stimuli available to us, the contexts that affect how those sensory stimuli achieve meaning, the habituated movements and postures that we learn through culture and that are encoded for gender, ethnicity, and class—all affect how learning takes place and how the world comes into being for us.(1995, 56) [End Page 138]All this seems true, if one means that with reincarnation our native range experiences would be different. Wolves have keen noses and with them they experience, if you like, a different world. But the survival value of wolf noses, a situated knowledge for them, is equally true for humans, wolves, and elk, because all three... (shrink)

Defining value as the requiredness of an activity or object, the author describes value experiences and the nature, meaning, development, and function of value on the physical, psychological, and philosophical levels. Bibliogs.

In “Rescuing Conservatism: A Defense of Existing Value,” G. A. Cohen offers an anticapitalist philosophy of valuing that takes as given the existence itself of particular valuable and valued things, and commitment through time to cherishing relationships to them. In this article, I argue that “being placed,” in precolonial senses, and decolonial “being in” and “seeking place,” are the givens of being valuing, living creatures among valuing, living creatures. Valuing as placed and valuing being placed are intrinsic to decolonial (...) feminist resistance to the gendered, racialized, and denatured ideological warfare on the terms of life. Place is not one among other values; place and placed temporality must be accepted as given. In place, the past is living in the present. Placed decolonial valuing is the only resistance to solipsistic destruction of all that has value, to a coloniality that would fragment the past to destroy the life force of the capacity to value present existing and living. Thus I bring Cohen's rescuing valuable things, and the capacity to value them, to intergenerational, interspecies, temporally located placedness shared across diverse peoples prior to fifteenth- and sixteenth-century conquests and nineteenth-century imperialism, and in perpetual resistance to contemporary settler societies and coloniality. (shrink)

The current chapter discusses on the place of values in a world of politics: personality, motivation, and ideology. There are similarly daunting questions of a political or philosophical nature. If it is the case that value pluralism—if not outright conflict—is inevitable, what are the implications for democratic and related forms of governance? How might political institutions be designed so that citizens and policy makers alike will be able to absorb and tolerate ideological and other sources of conflicts without (...) perpetually devolving into stalemate situations? Presumably, a healthy, well-functioning, democratic society needs institutional mechanisms to determine which value priorities should frump others when critical decisions must be made. (shrink)

Values are numerous, interrelated and hard to discern in professional practice. This article reports on key findings from research into locating professional values within health social work practice in Aotearoa New Zealand. The research explores how 15 health social workers experience and negotiate value demands when working with newborn infants. A staged methodology underpinned by constructivist grounded theory was utilised to generate theoretical knowledge through two phases of semi-structured individual interviews. The research firmly located health social workers practice (...) in the middle ground of a complex, tension-ridden practice environment with health social workers courageously striving to balance competing requirements. Within a health model influenced by neoliberal policy, key tensions related to challenges faced due to professionals oversimplifying social circumstances in risk-laden situations. This resulted in issues of judgements, bias and racism being a central concern for the participants’ social work practice. Despite these tensions, the place of social justice as a primary organising value was affirmed by the research. A stronger focus on the profession’s values would strengthen the collective voice of health social workers and their identity, in order to better address the systemic drivers of health inequities. (shrink)

Researchers and other professionals unanimously agree that companies should become more sustainable, but this will not happen without the support of human resource management. Paradoxically, there is a lack of information on the support human resource management offers to organizational sustainability applied to real cases. Therefore, this research presents a case study on this topic that was carried out in a leading Brazilian company, which is considered as a model and has been selected as ‘the best place to work (...) in the country’. The results provide practical examples of how this family company has been working to guarantee an increasingly sustainable performance with the support of human resources, highlighting the achievements and challenges the company has faced. One of the main results indicates that companies seeking to achieve sustainability need the assistance of the human resource field in order to design a communication system which bridges the gap between practices and sustainable values. (shrink)

Researchers and other professionals unanimously agree that companies should become more sustainable, but this will not happen without the support of human resource management. Paradoxically, there is a lack of information on the support human resource management offers to organizational sustainability applied to real cases. Therefore, this research presents a case study on this topic that was carried out in a leading Brazilian company, which is considered as a model and has been selected as ‘the best place to work (...) in the country’. The results provide practical examples of how this family company has been working to guarantee an increasingly sustainable performance with the support of human resources, highlighting the achievements and challenges the company has faced. One of the main results indicates that companies seeking to achieve sustainability need the assistance of the human resource field in order to design a communication system which bridges the gap between practices and sustainable values. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that the values supported by scientists can have a role in episodes of theory choice. In the first part, I characterize the value- and the rulebased accounts of theory choice. In the second part, I analyze how the thesis of underdetermination of theory by empirical data can be used to argue for a value-based account. I discuss two versions of the underdetermination thesis, arguing that the weaker version, underdetermination by the evidence available at a (...) particular time, is sufficient for establishing the role of values in theory selection. Many authors distinguish between cognitive and non-cognitive values, considering that only the former ones have a legitimate role in theory choice. I defend this distinction, showing that it has both a normative and a descriptive dimension. I argue that cognitive values must not be seen as indicators of truth, but they can be characterized by their relation to the goal of science. In the end, I argue that, in spite of being justified and useful, the distinction between cognitive and non-cognitive values is not clear-cut. (shrink)

Researchers and other professionals unanimously agree that companies should become more sustainable, but this will not happen without the support of human resource management. Paradoxically, there is a lack of information on the support human resource management offers to organizational sustainability applied to real cases. Therefore, this research presents a case study on this topic that was carried out in a leading Brazilian company, which is considered as a model and has been selected as ‘the best place to work (...) in the country’. The results provide practical examples of how this family company has been working to guarantee an increasingly sustainable performance with the support of human resources, highlighting the achievements and challenges the company has faced. One of the main results indicates that companies seeking to achieve sustainability need the assistance of the human resource field in order to design a communication system which bridges the gap between practices and sustainable values. (shrink)

How to deal with non-epistemic values in science presents a pressing problem for science and society as well as for philosophers of science. In recent years, accounts of democratizing science have been proposed as a possible solution to this. By providing a case study on the establishment of the Intergovernmental Science-Policy comment: Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services comment: (IPBES), I argue that such accounts run into a problem when values are embedded in the general scientific and societal (...) setup to such an extent that they shape the terrain upon which such a democratization needs to take place. I introduce the notion of particularities as manifestations of values in science and state a problem of particularity, posed by the ways in which the interactive dimension of particularities interferes with democratic procedures for resolving value judgements in science. As a possible remedy, I propose enriching accounts of democratizing science by agonistic theories of democracy. (shrink)

Alongside concerns for animal welfare, concerns for land, water, and climate are undermining established food identities in many parts of the world. In Aotearoa New Zealand, agrifood relations are bound tightly into national identities and the materialities of export dependence on dairying and agriculture more widely. Dairy/ing identities have been central to national development projects and the politics that underpin them for much of New Zealand’s history. They are central to an intransigent agrifood political ontology. For the last decade, however, (...) they have been challenged by the identity politics of ethical food consumption. This paper explores the ensuing contests and asks how they are reshaping agrifood identities. We draw on interviews with 15 participants in Aotearoa New Zealand who have made dietary transitions that reduce or exclude dairy products. Our aim is not to identify a new post-dairying identity or claim a reconfigured national identity, but to examine the collision of production-consumption values in the context of a dominant place-based food identity. We ask how participants navigate contradictory commitments to becoming ‘good environmental citizens’ whilst remaining ‘good national citizens’. The paper offers insights for examining similar struggles elsewhere and the potential to shift agrifood relations and undermine entrenched political ontologies through ethical food consumption values. (shrink)

The current paradigm in medicine generally distinguishes between genetic and environmental causes of disease. Although the word paradigm has become a commonplace, the theories of Thomas Kuhn have not received much attention in the journals of medicine. Kuhn's structuralist method differs radically from the daily activities of the scientific method itself. Using linguistic theory, this essay offers a structuralist reading of Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Our purpose is to highlight the similarities between these structuralist models of science (...) and language. In part, we focus on the logic that enables Kuhn to assert the priority of perception over interpretation in the history of science. To illustrate some of these issues, we refer to the distinction between environmental and genetic causes of disease. While the activity of scientific research results in the revision of concepts in science, the production of significant differences that shape our knowledge is in part a social and linguistic process. (shrink)

I use the metaphor of an executive decision maker to help explain the relation of facts and values. I try to show how values both depend on facts and go beyond them. I also try to show how attempts to justify value judgments must cite the facts and at the same time meet special criteria appropriate for value judgments.

Today, values hold a prominent place both in business ethics and in organization theory. However, there persists considerable confusion about what these values are and what role they play in these theories and, therefore, how they can be developed both within the individual and within the organization. Therefore, this paper seeks to define a conception of values based on a theory of human action that can provide a basis for an organization theory, and to propose a (...) series of ideas about how personal and organizational values can be fostered. (shrink)

In assessing the appropriateness of a scientific community's research effort, Solomon considers a number of "decision vectors," divided into the empirical and non-empirical. Value judgments get sorted as non-empirical vectors. By way of contrast, I introduce Anderson's discussion of the evidential role of value judgments. Like Anderson, I argue that value judgments are empirical in the relevant sense. I argue further that Solomon's decision matrix needs to be reconceptualized: the distinction should not be between the empirical vs. non-empirical, but between (...) the relevant vs. irrelevant. Whether particular value judgments are relevant or not is an empirical question, to be decided on a case-by-case basis. (shrink)

This article aims to uncover the processes of developing sustainable business models in innovation ecosystems. Innovation ecosystems with sustainability goals often consist of cross-sector partners and need to manage three tensions: the tension of value creation versus value capture, the tension of mutual value versus individual value, and the tension of gaining value versus losing value. The fact that these tensions affect all actors differently makes the process of developing a sustainable business model challenging. Based on a study of four (...) sustainably innovative cross-sector collaborations, we propose that innovation ecosystems that develop a sustainable business model engage in a process of valuing value in which they search for a result that satisfies all actors. We find two different patterns of valuing value: collective orchestration and continuous search. We describe these patterns and the conditions that give rise to them. The identification of the two patterns opens up a research agenda that can shed further light on the conditions that need to be in place in order for an innovation ecosystem to develop effective sustainable business models. For practice, our findings show how cross-sector actors in innovation ecosystems may collaborate when developing a business model around emerging sustainability-oriented innovations. (shrink)

This paper explores the notion of 'relational values' from a phenomenological point of view. In the first place, it stresses that in order to make full sense of relational values, we need to approach them through a relational ontology that surpasses dualistic descriptions of the world structured around the subject and the object. With this aim, the paper turns to ecophenomenology's attempt to apprehend values from a first-person perspective embedded in the lifeworld, where our entanglement with (...) other beings is not a theoretical construction but a palpable reality. Overall, the article's main purpose is to show that, in our direct and raw experience, values do not appear as subjective judgments or as objective properties but as events in which we participate alongside other human and non-human beings. (shrink)

In this book, David M. Black asks questions such as 'why do we care?' and 'what gives our values power?' using ideas from psychoanalysis and its adjacent sciences such as neuroscience and evolutionary biology in order to do so. _Why Things Matter_ explores how the comparatively new scientific discipline of consciousness studies requires us to recognize that subjectivity is as irreducible a feature of the world as matter and energy. Necessarily inter-disciplinary, this book draws on science, philosophy and the (...) history of religion to argue that there can be influential values which are not based exclusively on biological need or capricious life-style choices. It suggests that many recent scientific critics of religion, including Freud, have failed to see clearly the issues at stake. This book will be key reading for psychoanalysts and psychotherapists as well as counsellors with an interest in the basis of religious feeling and in moral and aesthetic values. The book will also be of interest to scholars of psychoanalysis, philosophy and religion. (shrink)

Ethics and Values in Psychotherapy examines the ways in which the ethical convictions of both therapist and client contribute to the practical process of psychotherapy. Practitioners are increasingly focusing on the issue of their extensive--and often problematic--ethical influence on clients as they attempt to agree on guidelines and standards for professional practice. Alan C. Tjeltveit argues that any discussion of ethical practice in psychotherapy must be carried out in connection with traditional ethical theories. The author draws on scientific, clinical, (...) and philosophical approaches to address issues such as: the role of therapy in society; the goals and outcomes of psychotherapy; techniques and practices; the existence and operation of values; and the intellectual and social context in which therapy takes place. This comprehensive study is a significant contribution to the debate on the ethical character of psychotherapy. (shrink)

In the US Environmental Protection Agency, the World Wide Fund for Nature and many other environmental organisations, it is standard practice to evaluate particular woods, wetlands and other such places on the basis of the ‘ecosystem services’ they are thought to provide. I argue that this practice cannot account for one important way in which places are of value to human beings. When they play integral roles in our lives, particular places have a kind of value which cannot be adequately (...) conceived in terms of service provision. Since it is in this respect limited, the ecosystem services framework can, I suggest, be criticised on grounds of justice. (shrink)

This book studies the pilgrimage of the Ancient World in its search for moral truth. After a brief examination of the values which dominated Homeric society and the subsequent aristocracies, the central portion of the book is an account and analysis of the moral ideas which illuminated the Greek, Roman and Hebrew worlds during the classical period. The volume discusses the cardinal virtues, the place of friendship, Plato’s love, _philanthropia _and the moral insights of the Jewish prophets and (...) subsequently examines Christian love. (shrink)

In this article, I first analyze and assess the epistemological and semantic status of canonical value-range equations in the formal language of Frege’s Grundgesetze der Arithmetik. I subsequently scrutinize the relation between (a) his informal, metalinguistic stipulation in Grundgesetze I, Section 3, and (b) its formal counterpart, which is Basic Law V. One point I argue for is that the stipulation in Section 3 was designed not only to fix the references of value-range names, but that it was probably also (...) intended to play a regulative role with an eye to Basic Law V. I further intend to shed new light on the status of Frege’s identification of the truth-values with their unit classes in Grundgesetze I, Section 10 and determine its place and importance in his overall logicist project. In a subsequent section, I first discuss the hypothetical extendability of the logical system of Grundgesetze. In what follows, I analyze the incompleteness of that system—were it not inconsistent and hence trivially complete—by focusing on the role of the definite description operator and the axiom governing it (= Basic Law VI) as well as on the role of the application operator. The latter is defined by means of the former. I further comment on the redundancy of an axiom that could be designed to supplement Basic Law VI by incorporating the second clause of Frege’s two-part elucidation of the description operator. I argue that although it seems likely that Basic Law VI could have been shown to be dispensable in Grundgesetze, Frege would probably have been reluctant to dispense with it, despite his commitment to axiomatic parsimony. In my view, the reason is that he considers it essential that every primitive function-name of his formal language be governed and grounded by a basic law that is tailored to the nature and the role of the primitive name occurring at a key point in the law. Toward the end of the article, I propose solutions to two problems with Frege’s use of “=” in the concept-script sentences that result from his definitions involving the replacement of the double stroke of definition with the judgment-stroke. I conclude the article with a summary of the main results that I have achieved. (shrink)

This book studies the pilgrimage of the Ancient World in its search for moral truth. After a brief examination of the values which dominated Homeric society and the subsequent aristocracies, the central portion of the book is an account and analysis of the moral ideas which illuminated the Greek, Roman and Hebrew worlds during the classical period. The volume discusses the cardinal virtues, the place of friendship, Plato’s love, _philanthropia _and the moral insights of the Jewish prophets and (...) subsequently examines Christian love. (shrink)

In this 1969 text, Paul Roubiczek argues that in the age of science there is still a place for ethics and a need for the philosophical method. He attempts to prove this by examining the contributions of three disciplines - history, psychology and sociology - towards man's understanding of his moral involvement with society. By illustrating that all three leave gaps or lead to contradictions, he poses the question of whether it is possible to speak of an absolute morality, (...) which he answers by confronting 'objective method' with 'subjective method'. Only the latter can lead to a full understanding of ethics. Later, Roubiczek goes on to examine different ethical teachings, in particular, Kant's theory of knowledge and ethics, and shows that acceptance of an unconditional ethical teaching requires a Kierkegaardian 'leap into the unknown'. However, he claims that, in the field of ethics, the leap turns out to be certainty. (shrink)

The main claim of this thesis is that value-judgments should play a profound role in the construction and evaluation of species classifications. The arguments for this claim will be presented over the course of five chapters. These are divided into two main parts; part one, which consists of the two first chapters, presents an argument for a radical form of species pluralism; part two, which comprises the remaining chapters, discusses the implications of radical species pluralism for the role of (...) class='Hi'>values in species classification. The content of the five chapters is as follows. Chapter 1 starts with a discussion of the theoretical assumptions concerning species and natural kinds that form the broad framework within which the arguments of the thesis are placed. The aim of this chapter is to introduce a set of relatively uncontroversial assumptions that frame the rest of the thesis. On the basis of these assumptions, chapter 2 presents an argument for radical species pluralism. The chapter substantiates this argument with a broad range of examples, and compares this position to other forms of species pluralism. Chapter 3 returns to the main interest of the thesis, namely, the role of values in species classification. It introduces the notion of values and presents an argument for the value-ladenness of taxonomy on the basis of the considerations in the first two chapters. It then sketches three important views on values in science in the literature. Chapter 4 argues that the case presented in chapter 3 provides strong support for one of these views, called the ‘Aims View’, and against two other prominent views, called the ‘Epistemic Priority View’ and the ‘Value-Free Ideal’. The resulting view, in line with the Aims View, is that value-judgments should play a particularly substantial role in species classification. Chapter 5 then considers the popular assumption that these value-judgments in taxonomy commonly take the shape of generally accepted classificatory norms, and argues that this assumption is not tenable. Finally, a brief concluding chapter points at some implications of the claims and arguments in this thesis. (shrink)